In the Name of the UN Charter

The “Group of Friends” and the Future of Human Rights

By Venisa Wai 

The United Nations’ financial crisis has hit its human rights work hard. Country visits under the Human Rights Council’s Special Procedures mandates have been halved since 2025. But for one group of states that has spent five years arguing that the council’s country-specific mandates should not exist at all, such budget cuts come at an opportune moment. 

The Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations was established in 2021, reportedly at Venezuela’s initiative, and includes two permanent members of the Security Council: China and Russia. Presenting itself as a defender of the UN Charter, the 18-member Group has consistently sought to undermine country-specific Special Procedures mandates, both directly and indirectly, by casting them as contravening the UN Charter. This opposition reflects the self-interest of its members, eight of whom, including Belarus, Eritrea, Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”), and Russia itself, are subject to these mandates.  

The Group’s challenge extends beyond the Special Procedures to the liberal multilateral order built on the Charter. It is most visible in its interventions during interactive dialogues with the human rights special rapporteurs. For example, states critical of the Special Procedures mandate on human rights in the DPRK—almost all of them Group members—accounted for 15 of the 33 interventions during the Human Rights Council interactive dialogues in 2023, 14 of 34 interventions in 2024, 14 of 31 interventions in 2025, and 17 of 31 interventions in 2026.  

These interventions have followed two lines of argument. The first is direct: it claims that singling out countries for human rights monitoring contravenes the UN Charter. In its 2026 intervention, for example, Venezuela called on the Human Rights Council to put an end to country-specific mandates in full respect of the Charter. In a written statement to the General Assembly’s Third Committee (the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee) in October 2025, the Group argued that such mandates are against “the very spirit” of the Charter, citing sovereign equality (Article 2(1)) and non-interference in internal affairs (Article 2(7)) as the “timeless principles” it seeks to defend. 

The Group’s challenge extends beyond the Special Procedures to the liberal multilateral order built on the Charter.

The second line of argument is indirect, seeking to reorder the priority and resources given to different rights. Group members have consistently criticized the special rapporteur for the DPRK for not addressing what they describe as the country’s socioeconomic achievements—even when that year’s report focused on socioeconomic rights, as China’s 2026 intervention illustrates. They thereby shift attention toward the right to development and away from civil and political rights.  

At the Third Committee’s interactive dialogue with the special rapporteur and the Working Group on the Right to Development in 2025, the Group went further, calling for “reaffirming more than ever the transcendence of the right to development, which is enshrined in the very spirit of the UN Charter” (emphasis added). This re-prioritization of rights is intrinsically linked to resource allocation. In debates over the UN80 Initiative, the structural and budgetary reform plan launched by Secretary-General António Guterres in 2025, China argued that the Human Rights Council fails to prioritize the right to development while devoting resources to mandates marked by “resource intensiveness,” and urged “caution” in creating or renewing country-specific procedures. Similar patterns of intervention and lines of argument also appear in the interactive dialogues with other country-specific mandate holders, including those on Belarus, Eritrea, and Iran.  

Read against the Charter as a whole, the Group’s claims do not withstand scrutiny. First, on sovereign equality and non-interference, Article 2 requires the Charter’s principles to be applied “in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,” which include promoting respect for human rights (Article 1(3)), the purpose on which, together with Articles 55 and 56, the Special Procedures rest. As former UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression David Kaye observes, sovereign equality is not “a magic wand that states may wave to avoid UN consideration of their internal practices.” Article 2(7) protects only matters “essentially” within domestic jurisdiction, which human rights, now governed by international law, no longer are.

The Group’s emphasis on the right to development is legitimate, but a commitment to some rights cannot justify defunding the mechanisms that protect others.

Second, monitoring is not a form of singling out. Obligations concerning “the basic rights of the human person” are owed to the international community as a whole, as the International Court of Justice recognized in Barcelona Traction. The Human Rights Council is expressly mandated to “address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations,” situations in which the need for international monitoring arises.  

Third, development cannot be set against human rights. The United Nations rests on three founding pillars: peace and security, development, and human rights, which member states have affirmed are “interlinked and mutually reinforcing.” The Group’s emphasis on the right to development is legitimate, but a commitment to some rights cannot justify defunding the mechanisms that protect others, which would leave the United Nations unable to fulfill its mandates and uphold all rights equally. Such a hierarchy can hardly reflect the “very spirit” of the Charter, which, born of “the scourge of war” that brought “untold sorrow to mankind,” places human rights at its foundation. 

Neither line of argument is new. As early as the drafting of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviet Union argued that any form of international human rights monitoring would contravene the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in domestic affairs. China launched its 2021 Global Development Initiative aiming to “protect and promote human rights through development.” The Group consolidates and amplifies these positions into a shared discursive framework, giving them greater weight than any single state could achieve alone.

Defending the Charter means ensuring that the pillar it placed at its foundation is not sacrificed.

By proclaiming itself the defender of the Charter, the Group also speaks in the name of the very document from which the UN human rights mechanisms derive. Viewed in this light, its aim is not merely to undermine the Special Procedures out of self-interest, but to contest the legitimacy of the UN human rights system and to reframe the Charter, the bedrock of the multilateral order. Unfortunately, the UN80 Initiative offers the perfect opening to do so. 

Defending the Charter means defending the framework, tools, and resources required to uphold it. Human rights mechanisms now face not only resource constraints but also mounting political pressure, including not only from the Group but also from the United States’ imposition of sanctions in July 2025 on Francesca Albanese, the special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory. Yet these mechanisms are needed more than ever to address emerging challenges, from the human rights implications of artificial intelligence to a level of armed conflict not seen since the Second World War. The UN human rights pillar has historically been the least funded of the three and receives less than one percent of the UN’s total expenses when voluntary contributions are included. Defending the Charter means ensuring that the pillar it placed at its foundation is not sacrificed, either to budget cuts or to those who claim to speak in its name. True friends of the UN Charter must speak out now.

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Venisa Wai is a former legal extern to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The views expressed here are solely her own.


Suggested Citation:
Venisa Wai, “In the Name of the UN Charter: The “Group of Friends” and the Future of Human Rights,” USALI Perspectives, 7, No. 3, November 17, 2026, https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/in-the-name-of-the-un-charter.


The views expressed in USALI Perspectives are those of the authors, and do not represent those of USALI or NYU.

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