Past reform efforts have failed. Can this one succeed?
By Jaewoong Yoon
South Korea is carrying out one of the most far-reaching reforms of its modern legal history. In September, the National Assembly passed, and the Cabinet swiftly approved, an amendment to the Government Organization Act abolishing the 78-years-old Prosecutors’ Office. Effective October 2, 2026, prosecutorial and investigative powers will be fully divided between two new institutions: the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) under the Ministry of Justice and the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency (SCIA) under the Ministry of the Interior and Safety.
The reform marks the outcome of decades of debate over prosecutorial overreach, political influence, and the need to realign Korea’s criminal justice system with democratic principles of checks and balances. The once formidable authority of prosecutors in criminal cases will be significantly reduced. Major crimes previously investigated directly by prosecutors will now fall under the jurisdiction of the SCIA, while the PPS will focus solely on prosecution, including decisions on indictment, courtroom advocacy, and warrant applications. Similar reorganizations will take place at the provincial and municipal levels.
Many challenges lie ahead. Will the reform succeed in depoliticizing the prosecutorial power? Can it restore public confidence that criminal investigations are fair and unbiased?
Will the reform succeed in depoliticizing the prosecutorial power? Can it restore public confidence that criminal investigations are fair and unbiased?
The Prosecutors’ Office was established with the founding of the Republic in 1948. It inherited the structure of the Japanese colonial prosecution system as the central institution for criminal law enforcement, with both investigative and prosecutorial powers. Over time, however, its monopolization of power led to deepening public distrust. The Prosecutors’ Office was accused of political bias, selective investigations, and undue leniency toward its own members. Political clashes surrounding prosecutorial investigations frequently intensified during transitions of power, reinforcing perceptions of politicization. Each of the past five presidents was investigated by prosecutors after leaving office in a pattern called “revenge politics.” (Two were convicted.) Other leading political figures including presidential candidates were investigated and prosecuted. Criminal charges brought against current President Lee Jae-myung during his candidacy have been paused while he serves in office.
Since democratization, successive governments have sought to curb and decentralize prosecutorial authority. President Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) initiated an unprecedented open dialogue with rank-and-file prosecutors and achieved limited institutional progress, such as abolishing rigid hierarchical control within the Prosecutors’ Office, known as the “principle of prosecutorial unity.” However, strong resistance from prosecutors and ongoing investigations targeting key government figures gradually weakened the momentum for reform. By the end of the Roh administration, the prosecution was widely perceived as having openly sided with conservative political forces against Roh. A prominent example was the 2007 investigation into then-presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak’s alleged involvement in stock manipulation and disguised real estate holdings. Prosecutors cleared Lee, a conservative, of all charges and he went on to become president (2008-2013). Yet after leaving office, Lee was arrested and indicted on charges of embezzlement, bribery, and violations of the Political Funds Act, revealing the inadequacy of the earlier prosecutorial investigation.
The liberal Moon Jae-in administration (2017–2022), propelled by public anger over prosecutors’ “state capture,” launched an ambitious new wave of prosecutorial reform. He created the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO) to check prosecutorial monopoly over indictments and limited (but did not abolish) prosecutors’ direct investigative powers. These initiatives again provoked fierce internal resistance. Then-Prosecutor General Yoon Suk-yeol denounced the reforms and openly defied Moon, declaring that “the prosecutor general is not subordinate to the minister of justice.” He resigned in 2021 and, in a striking twist, was elected president the following year as the opposition candidate. Now, Yoon himself is standing trial on the charge of leading an insurrection after being impeached for declaring martial law in December 2024.
Against this backdrop, the abolition of the Prosecutors' Office, finalized shortly after Lee Jae-myung succeeded Yoon in June 2025, can be understood as the culmination of prosecutorial reform discussions accumulated over the past two decades. Why was this long-stalled reform finally realized at this particular moment? The answer lies largely with the prosecution itself. Widespread criticism mounted that President Yoon, whose rise to power was facilitated by the prosecution, had transformed Korea into a “prosecutorial republic” by filling key government positions with former prosecutors who often lacked the professional expertise required for those roles. Under Yoon, prosecutors launched aggressive, wide-ranging investigations and indictments against then-opposition leader Lee Jae-myung, who had lost the 2022 presidential election to Yoon by a mere 0.73 percent margin, as well as key figures from the Moon Jae-in administration. In contrast, prosecutors failed to properly investigate and prosecute those close to Yoon, including his wife, Kim Keon-hee, who was alleged to have financed a stock manipulation scheme. All this strengthened public demand for fundamental reform.
The new structure represents a fundamental redesign of Korea’s criminal justice system.
The new structure represents a fundamental redesign of Korea’s criminal justice system. By legally codifying the division of investigative and prosecutorial powers, it reshapes the power balance within the executive branch. The prosecutor general, previously a ministerial-level official wielding broad influence, will give way to two vice-ministerial positions: the heads of the SCIA and PPS, operating under separate chains of command within the Ministry of the Interior and Safety and the Ministry of Justice. This arrangement ends the era when the prosecution functioned as a quasi-independent power comparable to the judiciary.
This transformation also aims to prevent future abuses of authority and reinforce the protection of fundamental rights. The Yu Woo-sung case vividly demonstrated the dangers of unchecked prosecutorial discretion. Yu was wrongfully charged with espionage based on fabricated evidence, later acquitted, and then re-indicted on minor charges in a case widely condemned as retaliatory. In 2021, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution had abused its authority to indict.
Despite its promise, the reform faces significant challenges. The first concerns investigative efficiency. Critics warn that without direct investigative power, prosecutors may struggle to respond swiftly to complex cases. The SCIA and PPS could encounter coordination problems or accountability disputes. To address this, the government plans to establish a standing consultation mechanism between the new institutions and allow the PPS to request supplementary investigations when needed.
The second challenge is ensuring effective oversight of the new institutions. Some observers worry that the SCIA could evolve into another powerful, unaccountable authority. Discretion must not simply shift to police or other investigative agencies. Sustaining institutional checks and balances will be critical.
If this reform fulfills its promise, Korea will have demonstrated that deeply entrenched authoritarian legacies can be dismantled through determined democratic action.
The third challenge is administrative readiness. For the PPS and SCIA to operate effectively, the government must complete organizational design, staffing, budgeting, and systems integration within a year. Transitional confusion could disrupt law enforcement and public safety. Encouragingly, a Prosecution Reform Task Force launched on October 1 is preparing draft legislation for the PPS and SCIA, amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act, and more than a thousand related legal and regulatory provisions. The task force also will oversee personnel recruitment, budgeting, and infrastructure planning to ensure a seamless transition.
Korea's decision to abolish its Prosecutors' Office is more than an institutional reshuffling. It is a normative reconfiguration of state authority, designed to re-calibrate the distribution of coercive powers in line with democratic values. The chief prosecutor will no longer be able to unilaterally decide to prosecute opposition party leaders or shield allies from accountability. If this reform fulfills its promise, Korea will have demonstrated that deeply entrenched authoritarian legacies can be dismantled through determined democratic action. The hope is that this bold transformation will usher in a new era of genuine justice, where prosecutorial and investigative agencies exist not as instruments of political control, but as true servants of the people and guardians of the rule of law.
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Jaewoong Yoon is a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute and a senior official in South Korea’s Ministry of Legislation. His analysis is his own.
Suggested Citation:
Jaewoong Yoon, “South Korea Reins In Its Powerful Prosecutors,” USALI Perspectives, 6, No. 4, November 16, 2025, https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/south-korea-reins-in-its-powerful-prosecutors.
The views expressed in USALI Perspectives are those of the authors, and do not represent those of USALI or NYU.
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