South Korea’s Constitutional Court reminds us that in a democracy, opinions contrary to one’s own may have equal value.
By Eungi Hong
“The Republic of Korea shall be a democratic republic.” With this quote from the opening article of South Korea’s Constitution, the Constitutional Court of Korea unanimously upheld the impeachment of President Yoon Seok-yeol for having declared martial law four months earlier. A district court is separately trying now-former President Yoon on the criminal charge of insurrection. South Koreans will elect a new president on June 3.
This was the third presidential impeachment proceeding since South Korea’s democratic transformation in 1987 and the second time that impeachment was upheld. I have made an unofficial English translation of the Constitutional Court’s decision, provided here, because of its legal and political significance.
The April 4 decision reveals the Constitutional Court’s effort to balance speed and fairness in handling a case that had deeply divided the nation. By conducting an expedited trial but still allowing for a sufficient period of deliberation and ultimately issuing a decision written in clear and accessible language, the court seems to have sought to respond to the gravity of the matter and the high level of public interest with procedural care and judicial integrity.
The court seems to have sought to respond to the gravity of the matter and the high level of public interest with procedural care and judicial integrity.
Here is a quick recap of what happened. President Yoon’s proclamation of martial law on December 4, 2024, in the absence of any war or a similar emergency shocked the nation and the world. The following day, the National Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the termination of martial law, to which the president acceded. On December 14, 2024, the National Assembly passed a motion to impeach the president. The Constitutional Court accepted the impeachment case on the same day (Case No. 2024Hun-Na8), held two pretrial hearings, and held eleven hearings between January 14 and February 25. Meanwhile, in a separate proceeding, President Yoon was arrested on January 19 pursuant to a warrant issued by a district court judge on charges of insurrection under the Criminal Act, and was indicted on January 26. For more background on the constitutional and criminal charges, see my prior Perspectives essay, South Korea’s President on Trial: An Explainer.
During the impeachment trial, the Constitutional Court examined 16 witnesses, including former Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun, Commissioner General of the National Police Agency Cho Ji-ho, and former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo. After concluding the final hearing on February 25, the court held deliberations and delivered its judgment on April 4, 2025—38 days after the final hearing and 111 days after the case was filed. By comparison, the impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun was dismissed in 2004 within 63 days, while the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2017 was upheld within 91 days. Article 38 of the Constitutional Court Act provides that the court shall issue a final decision within 180 days of the filing of a case. Although this provision is generally regarded as advisory rather than mandatory, the urgency of the situation demanded expedited proceedings. The extended suspension of President Yoon from his official duties following the National Assembly's impeachment motion posed a serious risk of political instability, and public conflict over the legality and gravity of the president’s actions risked deepening social divisions.
The record of proceedings confirms that the court was meticulous in its work despite the multiple pressures on it – including the pending retirement of two justices on April 18. Because a presidential impeachment decision requires the concurring votes of at least six of the nine justices, and only eight were seated at the time, the decision had to be rendered while the court still met the quorum and had some room for dissenting views. Ultimately, there was no dissent.
Compared to the 89-page ruling in the impeachment of President Park and the 61-page dismissal in the case of President Roh, this 114-page decision (in the original Korean) sets out the relevant facts in considerable detail. The court addressed all seven procedural objections raised by President Yoon in the order presented, rejecting each in turn. These included the argument that a presidential declaration of martial law was a political question not reviewable by the court, and that the brief duration of the martial law order meant no harm was done, making the case moot.
The court then analyzed the five actions forming the basis for impeachment: the declaration of martial law, the deployment of military and police forces toward the National Assembly, the issuance of the martial law decree, the attempted seizure and search of the National Election Commission, and the attempted surveillance of former justices. For each act, the court laid out the respondent’s counterarguments and offered a detailed rebuttal in clear, accessible language.
The court unequivocally stated that there is no such thing as a “warning” or “appeal” form of martial law. A president’s subjective sense of crisis is not enough.
The respondent repeatedly argued that the martial law declaration was intended only as a warning or appeal to the public regarding the opposition party’s abuse of power and the resulting crisis in governance. With majority control of the National Assembly, the Democratic Party had initiated twenty-two impeachment motions against President Yoon’s executive branch appointees and rejected his budget proposals, among other actions. But the court firmly rejected this frame, and unequivocally stated that there is no such thing as a “warning” or “appeal” form of martial law.
In its discussion of the substantive requirements for declaring martial law, the court explained: “Martial law may be declared only in the face of an actual crisis that cannot be managed by police power alone, and not merely in anticipation of a possible crisis or for proactive purposes such as promoting public welfare.” A president’s subjective sense of crisis is not enough.
The conclusion begins on page 65 of the English translation with the quote that opened this essay, from Article 1(1) of the Constitution. The court then reminded readers what it means to be a democracy: citizens must “acknowledge that opinions contrary to one’s own may have equal value.” It acknowledged that the opposition party repeatedly obstructed the president and failed to engage in dialogue and compromise in pursuit of the national interest, as it should have done. But President Yoon also failed to deploy democratic channels for persuasion or treat the Assembly as a partner in governance, respecting the balance of powers laid down by the Constitution.
Instead, the court wrote, President Yoon declared martial law with the aim of overcoming the legislature through military force. This amounted to treating the National Assembly as an adversary to be excluded, a stance fundamentally incompatible with democratic governance. Alluding to Korea’s past experience of military rule, the court observed that the respondent had effectively “revived a history of abusing emergency powers, shocking the public and causing chaos across all areas of society—economic, political, diplomatic and more.”
“The respondent violated the Constitution and laws, failed to uphold the duty to protect the Constitution, and gravely betrayed the trust of the sovereign people of the democratic republic,” the court concluded.
By rendering a unanimous decision, the eight justices apparently sought to unify and persuade a public sharply divided in the aftermath of the martial law declaration.
As Koreans prepare to elect a new president, this ruling deserves careful attention. It demonstrates the resilience of a healthy constitutional democracy that addresses political crises by resorting to law. Perhaps it will also serve as a compass for voters, guiding them to choose a candidate committed to upholding the Constitution and democratic principles.
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Links to official texts of the Constitutional Court’s Impeachment Decisions
President Roh Moo-hyun (2004)
President Park Geun-hye (2017)
President Yoon Seok-yeol (2025)
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Eungi Hong is a is a presiding judge in the Gwangju District Court and a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute.
Suggested citation:
Eungi Hong, “South Korea’s Presidential Impeachment Decision Is Worth Reading,” USALI Perspectives, 5, No. 10, May 30, 2025, https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/south-koreas-presidential-impeachment-decision-is-worth-reading.
The views expressed in USALI Perspectives essays are those of the authors, and do not represent those of USALI or NYU.
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